Language in Buddhist Teachings: the Role of Cataphatic, Apophatic and Aesthetic Tendencies in Indian Buddhism and Ch’an/Zen

In this essay, I will attempt to show and analyse the fruitfully ambivalent tendency in Buddhist philosophy insofar as language and teachings are concerned - namely the role of cataphatic¹, apophatic² and aesthetic³ discourses in different Buddhist traditions. I will limit my discussion to Early Buddhism (especially Theravāda), Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism (especially Madhyamaka) and Ch’an/Zen; I will move both diachronically and synchronically, thus highlighting similarities and differences across and within selected traditions. I will proceed dialectically (albeit not in a strictly Hegelian sense) by first analysing the cataphatic tendency (thesis), followed by the apophatic one (antithesis), then considering the aesthetic strand (synthesis). I will conclude my exposition by attempting to emphasise how all three tendencies are fluidly, dynamically intertwined and embraced in the quintessentially Buddhist ‘concept’ of the Middle Way.

Cataphatic tendency

¹ Cataphatic means speaking positively, saying what something is.
² Apophatic is the opposite of cataphatic and it means speaking only negatively, trying to express something by saying what it is not. Both terms are mostly used in theological context.
³ I use here the term ‘aesthetic’ in its multi-faceted meanings: concerning beauty and judgments of sentiment and taste (see Kant); as intuitive, other-than or beyond rational experience; and etymologically, from the Greek aesthē: to feel, thus as linked to the senses, the sensory and perceptual realm.
The role of cataphatic language in Buddhist teaching is most prominent in Early Buddhism, especially in the Theravāda school, as it can be surmised and demonstrated by analysing the Pali Canon, ‘the original Pali texts of the Tipiṭaka, universally accepted by scholars as the earliest [fullest] extant records of the teachings of the Buddha.’

In the *Pañha Sutta* – when asked about what kind of speech he uses (linked to what we would call the epistemological conditions for truth) - the Buddha refers to four categories of questions:

- those that can be answered categorically, straightforwardly
- those that can be answered in a qualified way in accordance with a careful analysis of the question
- those that can be answered by a counter-question, to clarify what is being asked, reveal presuppositions, or shift attention to a parallel situation so as to draw conclusions from it
- those not to be answered, but set aside, as question-begging and fraught with misconceptions. 

The Buddha says he *would teach*, at the proper time, what he knows to be true and spiritually beneficial, whether agreeable or disagreeable to others, having therefore a spiritually pragmatic criterion for what and when to teach, yet a sophisticated, context-sensitive correspondence truth, seeing phenomena as complex, ever-changing and interacting

---


6 Harvey, 2008a: section 4.1.
processes, conditionally co-arising, not as substantial essences. His truth is founded on experiential basis: purified sense experience plus meditative knowledge, with the addition of reasonable inferences from these two. The Buddha teaches how to see ‘things as they are’ - bhūta - or better, ‘things as they have become or come to be’ and yathābhūta, ‘things as they have come to be thus’ (not static, ontological essences).

Moreover, it is clear in many passages of the Canon that the Buddha sets out to expound the truth: the Dhamma. Interestingly enough, the Buddha chooses the word dhamma when discussing his teachings, rather than the more commonly used word ‘sat’, which is more widespread in Brahmanical teachings, especially in the Upaniṣads (which equate truth and being using sat for both connotations). I think that Gethin masterly summarises the many interlinked meanings of the semantically rich word dhamma/dharma when he writes:

_Dharma_ is the way things ultimately are; it is also the Buddha’s teaching, since it is in accordance with the way things ultimately are. Physical and mental events are the ultimate building blocks of the way things ultimately are; thus to understand the Buddha’s teaching and see Dharma is to see things in terms of dharma. Ultimately dharmas are all there is._

The word dhamma/dharma is best left untranslated as it encompasses a complex web of interwoven facets: ontological, soteriological, gnoseological, phenomenological, ethical,

---


doctrinal and psychological. With regards to illustrating the Dhamma, Buddhist teachings use mostly cataphatic language.

Ontologically speaking, from the ultimate perspective (paramārtha), dhammas/dharmas are the basic patterns, the fundamental configurations, the basic processes that make up reality as it is experienced (through the eyes of trained wisdom, not as we normally see it): dynamic, ephemeral events (except for the unconditioned dhamma), not lasting essences or substances in an Aristotelian sense. The Abhidhammic Dharma-theory sees reality as ‘a dancing interplay of evanescent processes of fundamental and real regularities “maintaining” nature: a network of ever-changing inter-related basic patterns making up the pulsing fabric of existence.’\(^9\) Moreover, Dhamma/Dhārma is the natural order of things, the way things are (Paṭiccasamuppāda), as explained in the Suttas.

From a gnoseological viewpoint, Dhamma/Dhārma is the Buddha’s knowledge and teaching, what he discovered at Awakening, the content of his gnosis/ñāna, namely the Four Noble/Ennobling Truths\(^1\), which are subsequently elaborated in the doctrine of Conditioned Arising (‘Whoever sees conditioned arising sees Dhamma and whoever sees Dhamma sees Conditioned Arising’, M.I.191). As it is ritually chanted in Theravāda monasteries:

---


\(^1\) Or, alternatively translated, the ‘Four Realities of the Noble One(s)’, as Harvey recently seems to prefer, possibly emphasizing the status of phenomenological and experiential reality of Buddhist truths. See http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn56/sn56.011.harv.html.
well expounded by the Lord is Dhamma, visible here and now, timeless/immediate\textsuperscript{12}, having the quality of “come and see”, leading onwards (to nibbāna), to be directly experienced by the wise for themselves\textsuperscript{13}.

However, an apophatic element is also present in this dominant cataphatic tendency. Although the Dhamma is – cataphatically - to be heard/read and understood (pariyatti), practised (paṭipatti) and realised (paṭivedha), it is simultaneously – apophatically – ‘profound (gambhīro), hard/difficult to see and to fathom, peaceful and sublime, unattainable by mere reasoning/not within the sphere of reasoning (atkkāvacaro), subtle, to be experienced by the wise’ (M.I.167). I see this statement as one of the many symptoms of the internal tension within the Canon between the two roles of language, with its epistemological and gnoseological consequences. Although it is possible to see Paṭiccassamuppāda, to awaken to its reality and to go beyond it by realising Nibbāna, it is linguistically challenging to describe it using positive terminology.

For instance, the Suttas seem to prefer a metaphorical (and thus somewhat negative) explanation of the relationship between nidānas (conditioning links in the Conditioned Arising sequence), using various types of similes: hydraulic (causing to swell or ‘fill out’ by ‘feeding it’\textsuperscript{14}); organic (feeding, nurturing), fire (fuelling) and mechanical similes (supporting). The Suttas here use analogical language from everyday experience to attempt to convey the meaning of the complex and profound relationships between causes and conditions, drawing

\textsuperscript{12} Following Meiland’s suggestion in Meiland, 2007: 120.

\textsuperscript{13} A.II.156 for instance: svākkhāto bhagavatā dhammo sandiṭṭhiko akāliko ehipassiko opanaiko paccataṃ veditabbo viññūḥī ti.

\textsuperscript{14} Harvey, 2008c: section 3.
from agricultural, environmental and human images, ostensively pointing to rather than explicitly and cogently explaining and demonstrating.

On the other hand, the *Abhidhamma* seems to emphasise a more positive, assertoric, philosophically precise explanation of conditions (*paccaya*), which are said to be of 24 kinds. In the *Paṭṭhāna* (the seventh book of the *Adhidhamma*), there is a long and detailed list of conditions\(^\text{15}\), using precise categories to classify and discriminate between different types, thus showing a propensity for a more positive, cataphatic, detailed and specific elucidation (rather than a less exact and metaphorical one).

This internal ambivalence is also noticeable when considering the phenomenological and psychological characterisation of *dhammas/dharmas* as the basic regular patterns and processes as we know and experience them, i.e. reality as experienced phenomena, how it is presented to us and apprehended by us, in short *yathābhūta*. In the *Suttas*, the methodology is context-rich and sensitive, situational, using spoken language and dialects, conventional terminology, poetic images, narrative devices; whereas in the *Abhidhamma*, there is a shift towards a phenomenological psychology (albeit with a soteriological aim) using technical, specific, philosophically assertoric language: a detailed investigation and exposition, an ‘attempt to give a systematic and exhaustive account of the world by breaking it down into its constituent physical and mental events.’\(^\text{16}\)

Another topic that reveals the fruitful tension between the role of cataphatic and apophatic language in Buddhist teachings is the issue of wrong view, right view and right

---

\(^\text{15}\) See ṇāṇamoli, 1991: XVII 66-104 and 111.

\(^\text{16}\) Gethin, 1998: 204.
seeing/no view in the Canon. There are many passages in the Suttas in which the Buddha explicitly criticises wrong views and advocates right view (both lokiya – ordinary – and lokottara – transcendent). In the Brahmajāla Sutta (prestigiously positioned as the first discourse in the Dīgha Nikāya, itself the first collection of discourses in the Theravādin Sutta Piṭaka), there is a ‘systematic exposition and critique of the varieties of speculative views’17 with its strong criticism of sixty-two wrong and pernicious views (micchā diṭṭhis): 18 wrong views about the past (eternalists, semi-eternalists, finitude or infinity of the world, evasive ‘eel-wrigglers’, self and world arisen by chance) and 44 speculative views on the future (especially annihilationist ones). The Buddha’s main concern, in my opinion, is to acknowledge and criticise all wrong views of his time, so as to clear the way from any intellectual impediment to practising the Path to Liberation (soteriological aim).

There are also many instances18 in which the Buddha extols the benefits of both lokiya sammā diṭṭhi (ordinary right view)19 and lokottara sammā diṭṭhi (transcendental right view)20. Although there may seem to be a tension between critiquing the holding and clinging to views21, whilst advocating both ordinary and transcendent right view, I believe this can

18 For example in the Mahā-cattārīśaka Sutta, MN, Sutta 117, in the Sammā Diṭṭhi Sutta, M. I. 46-55, in the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta, D.II.311-12 (when discussing right view as part of the Ennobling Eightfold Path) and in the Nidāna samyutta, Sutta 15, S.II.17.
19 The belief in the goodness and benefits of giving (dāna), in karma and rebirth, in other worlds, in morality and in the path, leading in the right direction, yet associated with clinging if not tested by wisdom, dependent on conditions (impermanent and dukkha). This is conceptual right view, the intellectual grasp of Buddha’s teachings, the potential germ for direct seeing.
20 Direct seeing (not ‘view’), wisdom (paññā), factor of the path, experiential insight into anicca, dukkha, anattā and Conditioned Arising.
21 See Harvey, 2008d. The Buddha warns against grasping at views as: one of the four kinds of grasping leading to dukkha; one of the āsavas (D.II.82); inevitably leading to quarrels (A.I.66) and conceit (Sn. 842-3). Generally
satisfactorily be explained from a temporal, diachronic standpoint. As there are ‘different degrees of paññā’\textsuperscript{22} along the Path, there are perhaps different degrees of attachment to views in the first stages on the journey to Liberation. The Path is a road to be walked, which entails time (and effort). If it is true that at Stream-Entry the Dhamma is glimpsed all at once (the opening of the Dhamma-eye), it also true that we move along the path step by step, across time, even across lifetimes. Therefore, from a didactic, soteriological perspective, I can appreciate the decisive importance to ‘hold’, albeit temporarily and with the minimum possible attachment, a correct rather than an incorrect view of the way things are, so as to be able, whilst progressing on the path, to move from a ‘view’ to a direct, experiential, intuitive seeing of the Dhamma\textsuperscript{23}. The Buddha is therefore keen to explain cataphatically and discriminate between different views, with great subtlety and sophistication.

Nevertheless, there seems to be a more apophatic strand in the Suttas with regards to the role of diṭṭhis and the relinquishing of all views. Apart from the emphasis on the endless quarrelling over divergent views\textsuperscript{24}, there is hint that even a direct rejection of all views, though seen as close to non-clinging, is nonetheless a view of some sort: ‘a wise person abandons that view and does not take up some other view’ (M. I. 499). ‘A monk whose mind is

\textsuperscript{22} Gethin, 1997: 5 (reprinted with corrections).

\textsuperscript{23} I liked Gethin’s suggestion (Gethin, 1997) of understanding sammā diṭṭhi (both lokiya and lokottara) in terms of faith (saddhā), trustful, heart/mind-based confidence that spurs us on to following the path and practising, rather than a diṭṭhi (with its manifold negative connotations).

\textsuperscript{24} For example, in reference to samaṇas and Brahmins (‘this alone is true, all else is futile’) being blind and eyeless... in the parable of blind men and elephant: a narrow, blinkered, partial, one-dimensional, incomplete experience cannot claim to be truth, as it generates inappropriate generalisations (Udāna 65-69, VI.4). Elsewhere, there is also a strong criticism of a welter, thicket, jungle, froth of view in which men are trapped and confused.
thus liberated, Aggivessana, sides with none and disputes with none; he employs the speech currently used in the world without adhering to it. An apophatic rejection of all views is even more conspicuous in the Ṭṭhaka Vagga of the Sutta Nipāta (vv.766-975), sixteen poems on the theme of non-clinging (one of which is clinging to views), where a seemingly paradoxical complete letting go of all views appears to be advocated. These utterances highlight, yet again, an underlying tension and ambivalence towards language and its ability to express and define the correct Buddhist vision, especially from the ultimate standpoint of a Buddha or an Arahat. That said, I would nonetheless tend to agree with the introductory comments by Thanissaro Bhikkhu, where he points out that these paradoxes should not be taken completely at face value, but interpreted by considering: the role of puns on language, the genre of philosophical enigma (where language is used to challenge the reader), the overall emphasis on word-play with didactic purpose and the soteriological aims; hence the interpretative reading should be transformational, rather than merely informative.

Overall, I would agree with Gomez that there is no emphasis on the ineffability of the goal/path in the Suttas, yet there are undeniable (and ultimately fruitful, from my point of view) notable exceptions in the Canon, especially in the Sutta Nipāta: goal-silence (the goal is

---

25 Dīghanakkha Sutta (Majjhima Nikāya Sutta 74, M.I.497-501). It is interesting that, on hearing this, Sāriputta, who was fanning the Buddha, attained Arahatship, and Dīghanakkha attained the Dhamma-eye that saw ‘all that is subject to arising is subject to cessation’ (yaṃ kiṃci samudaya dhamma saṁbāṃ taṁ nirodha dhamma), becoming a stream-enterer.

26 It is interesting that the genre used here is poetry, thus hinting a shift towards aesthetic language. I will examine this further in the last part of the essay.

27 See Harvey, 2008d: section 5.

utterly indescribable) and path-silence (some kinds of talking and theorising are obstacles in the path).

Let us now examine more closely some more explicit apophatic passages of Theravāda and Madhyamaka teachings, to corroborate our thesis.

**Apophatic tendency**

A crucial issue that demonstrates the role of apophatic language in the Canon is the ten *avyākata* (undetermined) questions. I see four main reasons as to why the Buddha leaves the set of ten questions undetermined and undeclared, which I will analyse in order of priority (from my point of ‘view’, of course).

1. **Soteriological reason**

As explained to Ven Māluṅkyaputta in the homonymous *Sutta*, these questions and their answers ‘are not connected with the goal, are not fundamental to the holy life. They do not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, calming, direct knowledge, self-awakening, Unbinding. That’s why they are undeclared by me.’ The Buddha uses the simile of the poisoned arrow to emphasise the urgency of Awakening to the reality of dukkha, its origin, its cessation and the Path leading thereto. It is interesting that the Buddha is talking to one of his monks, rather than a layperson, when he gives this explanation about the undeclared questions; I see this as possibly the main reason for leaving the questions aside whilst being engaged in the

---

29 See the *Cūḷa-Māluṅkya Sutta*, M.I.426-31: Is the world eternal? Is the world not eternal? Is the world finite? Is the world infinite? Is the life-principle (*jīva*) the same as the mortal body (*sarīra*)? Is the life-principle (*jīva*) different from the mortal body (*sarīra*)? A tathāgata is after death? A tathāgata is not after death? A tathāgata both is and is not after death? A tathāgata neither is nor is not after death?

practice, as they are not salvific questions and answers. The Buddha is an unsurpassed religious teacher, compassionately concerned about our suffering, ceaselessly pointing to Awakening. Moreover, being overly preoccupied with these questions and their answers would certainly lead to papañca, conceptual proliferation, being assailed by ideas which disturb the path from within.  

2. Moral reason

Following Collins’s line of thought, I agree that a chief concern of the Buddha as a religious teacher is to lead his disciples into ‘laying down the sword’ of verbal and intellectual warfare and into ‘becoming armyleess’, relinquishing lust for views and desire for verbal combat against other ascetics. The Buddhist precepts prescribe ahimsā in body, speech and thought; views inevitably lead to quarrels, to the disruption of peace and amicable relationships.

3. Logical reason

Most importantly for my discussion on apophatic tendencies, the ten undetermined questions are linguistically and logically ill-posed, as they are based on a misunderstanding about the nature of reality, projected out of a firm and misconceived self-identification view (sakkāya-diṭṭhi), coloured by the distorting glasses of the belief in a Self. For example, when discussing the questions about the world (S.I.62 and S.IV.95), the Buddha uses a phenomenological (in modern philosophical jargon) approach to awaken us to the fact that we are always (though rarely consciously) talking about our lived world of experience. Loka - the world - is always our

---

32 Ibid., p. 139-140.
33 As quoted in Harvey, 2008e: section 4.
experienced world, a product of mind (mano)-based (mis)interpretation (saññā) of sense-organs inputs, spun out of beginningless greed, hatred and ignorance. Therefore, ill-formed questions cannot be meaningfully answered from the point of view of Dhamma-eye, they just don’t make sense.

4. ‘Mystical’ reason

As the bhikkunī Khemā, answering King Pasenadi on the undeclared questions by the Lord puts it: ‘Who can count the grains of sand in the river Ganges...?... Who can count the water in the great ocean...?... The Tathāgata, great king, is liberated from reckoning in terms of form; he is deep, immeasurable, hard to fathom like the great ocean’34. It might not please the agonistic philosopher in us wanting to logically argue on everything, but there are realms that logical reason cannot fathom.

In addition to the unanswered questions, there are other connected passages that emphasise the role of apophatic language, such as: the parable of the poisoned arrow; the parable of the simśāpa leaves and the parable of the blind men and the elephant (directly applied in the Suttas to the avyākata questions!).

A second major theme connected with negative language is the nature of Nibbāna/Nirvāṇa and its characterisation in the Suttas, which I believe is particularly illuminating with regards to the ambivalence between cataphatic and apophatic language shown so far. From a positive standpoint, the Suttas seem to be clear on what Nibbāna/Nirvāṇa actually is: the event of the complete destroying of the three fires/poisons (rāga/lobha, dosa and

moha)\textsuperscript{35}, the experience of the complete extinguishing of dukkha\textsuperscript{36}, the stopping of the khandhas\textsuperscript{37}, the utter destruction of the āsavas\textsuperscript{38}. Moreover, it is the content glimpsed at Stream-entry and fully known at the moment of Awakening: the Unconditioned realm. Finally, it is the object of signless concentration\textsuperscript{39} (and possibly, according to Harvey’s interpretation, a transformed state of discernment/consciousness)\textsuperscript{40}.

However, when examining the language used to convey the meanings of Nibbāna/Nirvāṇa, there appears to be a predilection for apophatic language, for images, metaphors, similes and expression pointing at what Nibbāna/Nirvāṇa is not, mostly using the linguistic privative prefixes ‘a’, ‘vi’ and ‘ni’. There is a wealth of examples in the Canon, for instance at Saṃyutta 43 (S.IV.360-73)\textsuperscript{41}, where Nibbāna/Nirvāṇa is negatively qualified as: asāṅkhatam (unconditioned), anatam (uninclined), anāsavaṃ (taintless), ajajjaram (undecaying), apalokitam (undisintegrating), anidassanam (non-manifestive), amatam (deathless), anittikam (unailing), anittikam dhammam (unailing state), avyāpajjho (unafflicted), anālayo (unclinging), virāgo (non-attachment) and nippapañca (unelaborated). I would argue that this reveals a reluctance to categorically define, to positively circumscribe a reality that is ultimately beyond\textsuperscript{42} linguistic

\textsuperscript{35} See the ‘fire sermon’ (Vin. I.34-5), cited in Harvey, 1990: 61.

\textsuperscript{36} See Dhammacakkapavattana Sutta, SV 420: ‘Now this, bhikkhus, for the Noble One(s), is the pain-ceasing reality. It is the remainderless fading away and cessation of that same craving, the giving up and relinquishing of it, freedom from it, non-reliance on it’, from http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn56/sn56.011.hary.html.

\textsuperscript{37} See Harvey, 2008f: section 1.


\textsuperscript{39} See Harvey, 2008f: section 1.6.

\textsuperscript{40} Harvey, 1995: 198-226.

\textsuperscript{41} Cited in Harvey, 2007: section 2

\textsuperscript{42} Pāraṃ (beyond) is also a description of Nirvāṇa/Nibbāna, S.IV.360-73.
description, as it is un-conditioned, whereas language is always conditioned. Perhaps the most famous and widely quoted passages are those from the Udāna: ‘Monks, there exists the unborn (ajātaṃ), the unbecome, the unmade, the unconstructed...’ (Vagga 8, Sutta 3)\(^{43}\), in which the Buddha hints at the timeless realm of Nirvāṇa/Nibbāna through either negative or poetic attributes: the truth (saccam), the beyond (paramī), the subtle (nipunam), the very-hard-to-see (sududassam), the lasting (dhuvam), the peaceful (santam), the sublime (panītam), the auspicious (sivan), the secure (kheman), the marvellous (acchariyaṃ), the amazing (abhhutam), purity (suddhi), freedom (mutti), the island (amidst the flood, dipam), the shelter (lenaṃ), the asylum (tānam), the refuge (saranam), the destination (parāyanaṃ)\(^{44}\).

Finally, the mysterious status of a tathāgata both in life and beyond death shows the propensity to apply apophatic language to any possible description. A tathāgata is in fact:

- beyond definition in life and after death as: gambhīro (deep, profound), appameyyo (immeasurable), duppariyogāho (hard-to-fathom)\(^{45}\)

- untraceable (beyond death): questions on his/her nature do not apply. Using a simile, it is said that for a fire gone out it is meaningless/inappropriate to ask in which direction (North, South, West and East) it has gone\(^{46}\). Moreover, (s)he is (even in life) freed from being reckoned by any upādānakkhandha (personality-

\(^{43}\)As cited in Harvey, 2007: section 5.

\(^{44}\)S.IV.360-73, cited in Harvey, 2007: section 2.

\(^{45}\)Abyākatasyutta, in Bhikkhu Bodhi, 2000: 1381.

\(^{46}\)Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta, M.1483-8, from [http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.072.than.html](http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.072.than.html).
factors\textsuperscript{47}, as having abandoned \textit{anusayas} (latent tendencies: “I am’ conceit, attachment, aversion, spiritual ignorance). There is no basis/criterion for determining his/her status

- immeasurable: there is no ‘I am’ conceit, therefore no boundaries (a \textit{tathāgata} dwells within a mind – \textit{ceto} – made to be without boundaries)

- inscrutable (\textit{ananuvejjo}): (s)he cannot be found.

I believe that the primary reason why a \textit{tathāgata} is seen as so mysterious even in life is because he/she is ultimately ineffable, beyond apprehension, beyond conceptualisation, beyond language and thinking. The soteriological and salvific event of realising \textit{Nibbāna} is beyond language support, as it is the very dropping away of the \textit{khandhas}, together with all the other fetters, the casting off of views and conceptual proliferation, the cessation of ‘I am’ conceit, of qualities and determinations.

The apophatic role of language is somewhat generalised and radicalised in the Madhyamaka school, especially by Nāgārjuna’s criticism of any essentialist doctrine of conditionality in his \textit{Mūlamadhyamakakārikā}. He adopts a \textit{via negativa}, using the \textit{prāsaṅga} methodology of taking up his opponent’s views and showing that all the four logical possibilities – \textit{catuskoti} – lead to nonsense, to absurd consequences or to statements that are not in line with what we observe in our experience: the \textit{reduction ad absurdum} method. His aim is to logically show that we cannot formulate a coherent metaphysics of causality/conditionality when assuming, theoretically or pre-theoretically, the essentialist

\textsuperscript{47} See Harvey, 2008g: section 3 and 4.
position of reality as made up of essences, svabhāvas. Nāgārjuna is focused on criticising any realist/essentialist view, not on proposing his own position to explain causality/conditionality.

His apophatic discourse is clarified with the notion of two (levels of) truths: conventional (saṃvṛti) and ultimate (paramārtha), which shows a strong nominalism in his language theory. Language and theories are only valid at the conventional level, where they can make logically coherent assertions. However, at the ultimate level, language is at most ostensive, can point to the truth that must be directly experienced and realised. Nāgārjuna

---

48 His interpretation of the Abhidharma notion of primary existents as endowed with svabhāva, which he shifts to mean ‘independently existing nature’ (i.e. independent of the designating mind), rather than simply, in more Abhidharmic terms, a characteristic mark or quality of each dharma.

49 Saṃvṛti: conventional and concealing. The Abhidharma analysis of dharmas is true, yet not essentially so. ‘If we examine with reasoning the conventional as it appears, no-thing is found. That nonfindingness is the ultimate’ (Atiśa). ‘Nāgārjuna will deny that it is possible to assert anything from the ultimate standpoint. He will urge that all truth is relative and conventional’ (Garfield, 1995: 101)… ‘The trick is to make correct use of conventional locutions without reifying denotata for all the terms’ (ibid., pp.114-5).

50 Emptiness as the articulation of the Middle Way of Conditioned Arising; everything is empty of inherent existence (ni.hsvabhāva). However, emptiness is not the ultimate reality, emptiness itself is empty, lacks inherent existence, is relational, is emptiness of, is dependent on things being empty. Ultimate truth is wise seeing of conventional AS conventional (not disparaging the conventional for something higher and more real), that’s gnosis, abandoning all tendencies to conceptualise, all prapañca, that’s Nirvāṇa, pacification of verbal/conceptual proliferation, non-construction of conditioned world of saṃsāra.

51 ‘Empty should not be asserted. ‘Nonempty’ should not be asserted. Neither both nor neither should not be asserted. They are only used nominally’, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, XXII, 11, Examination of the Tathāgata, in Garfield, 1995: 61.

52 The conventional standpoint is assertoric (see Garfield, 1995: 212-3).

53 ‘The language must hence be understood, from the ultimate perspective, not as making assertions, but rather as ostending – indicating that which cannot be literally asserted without falling into nonsense’ (Garfield, 1995: 213). Ultimately there is no entity of which emptiness can be predicated upon, assertions are only nominally true at the conventional level. ‘The ultimate truth, then, is that there are no ultimate realities; existence is inconceivable and inexpressible as it has no ultimate ground’, (Harvey, 2008h: section 10).
suggests a total relinquishing of all views\textsuperscript{54} and all attempts to use cataphatic language, thus radicalising (and generalising) the apophatic tendency found in the Canon.

**Aesthetic tendency**

To conclude my essay, I would like to discuss another role of language in Buddhist teachings, which may synthesise the ambivalence between cataphatic and apophatic tendencies: aesthetic language. Although little used in Early Buddhism, there are significant passages in the *Theragāthā* where early *Arahats* express their open, free-from-attachment, spontaneous and poetic appreciation for natural beauty. They use aesthetic language of purified sensory (yet not sensual) delight for the natural environment, rejoicing at simple manifestations of everyday landscape beauty, showing an attitude of wonder and gratitude towards plants, animals, rocks, mountains, sky, clouds, and generally all natural elements\textsuperscript{55}. It seems to me an attempt to overcome a possible dichotomy between positive and negative language, creating a timeless - yet rhythmical - ludic space for embracing the contradiction of yearning to express the inexpressible, to say the unsayable, to reveal the hidden and concealing mystery of Awakening\textsuperscript{56}.

The role of aesthetic language becomes more prominent in the Ch’an/Zen tradition and is particularly evident and effective in Japanese *haiku*. I think that the *haiku* art form is perfectly suited to embody the Zen ‘spirit’ of what I would call an aesthetic theology

\textsuperscript{54} See MMK XXVII, Examinations of Views, 30: ‘I prostrate to Gautama, Who through compassion, Taught the true doctrine, Which leads to the relinquishing of all views’ (In Garfield, 1995: 83).

\textsuperscript{55} ‘Those rocks delight me, the colour of blue clouds, beautiful, cool with water, having pure streams, covered with Indagopaka insects’, *Theragāthā*, v. 1063, attributed to Mahā-Kassapa and cited in Harvey, 2008i: Section 1.

\textsuperscript{56} ‘The earth is sprinkled, the wind blows, the lightning flashes in the sky. My thoughts are quietened, my mind is well concentrated’, *Theragāthā*, v. 50, attributed to Vimala, see cited Session 29.
(borrowing from Earhart’s ‘intuitive and aesthetic approach’)\textsuperscript{57}. It is quintessentially poetry of awakening, as ‘the flash of poetic insight is an artistic counterpart to the Zen moment of enlightenment’\textsuperscript{58} in its subtle ability to evoke and suggest, rather than explain or even show. I would argue that \textit{haiku} is a purely suggestive art form, an intuitive, immediate, spontaneous expression of a sudden realization, whether that be a small or big \textit{satori}, a gentle irruption of reality into our subjective world, able to shatter - perhaps only for an instant - the illusory membrane between in and out, mind and body, subject and object.

\textit{Haiku poems} are not symbolic or representational, neither referring to/standing for something absent, nor portraying/copying something already present. It seems to me that \textit{haiku}’s power is in allowing the space/time for phenomena to ‘presence’ (as a verb) themselves\textsuperscript{59} in their coming to be and passing away, in their beautiful and delicate impermanence. \textit{Haiku} poetry evokes the ever-new arising and ceasing of reality, opens the gates of the mind to abide in quiet observation, without judgement or reflective process. It is the art of \textit{hishiryo}, ‘thinking without thinking’\textsuperscript{60}, the mindful pre-reflective attention to the mysterious unfolding and concealing of phenomena, presencing of things as they are/come to be (\textit{yathābhūta}). \textit{Haiku} poems evoke the aimless, purposeless (\textit{mushotoku}), immediate, ever-alert state of mind that Zen practice cultivates, ‘expressing the artist’s own inner state of going

\textsuperscript{57} Earhart, 1974: 128.

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{ibid.}, p. 140.

\textsuperscript{59} ‘Yes- cf [sic] I sometimes translate \textit{sati-paññāna} as ’presencing of mindfulness’- \textit{Haiku} seem to ’present’ an experience in a very immediate way, inviting the presence of mindfulness, so they meet ’in the middle’, Harvey, P., BUDM04 Discussion Folder Session 29: Zen and the arts, Reply to Lead Post, 5\textsuperscript{th} February 2008.

\textsuperscript{60} As Master Deshimaru said, commenting on Dōgen’s \textit{Fukanzazengi}, in Deshimaru, 1979: 19.
nowhere in a timeless moment"\textsuperscript{61}, being an echo, a reverberation, a sonorous resonance of such moments. *Haiku* poetry is full of emptiness, words are sounds delicately vibrating in silence, unobtrusively, ‘a pebble thrown in the pool of the listener’s mind, evoking associations out of the richness of his own memory’\textsuperscript{62}, inviting participation, not admiration. They renew the child-like awe-full sentiment of wonder, what the Japanese call *sono-mama*, ‘Just as it is’, or ‘Just so’.

**Conclusion**

In this essay, I have attempted to unearth an underlying, fruitful tension with regards to the attitude towards the role of language in Buddhist teachings, limiting my exposition to Theravāda sources, Madhyamaka school and Ch’an/Zen. I hope I have highlighted how cataphatic, apophatic and aesthetic languages are subtly interwoven in the Buddhist tradition to create a complex and sophisticated Middle Way approach to teachings, truth, practice and Awakening. I believe that these three tendencies towards language masterly embody the Buddhist Middle Way: a path that unifies in diversity, embraces yet maintains differences and peculiarities, holds and respects (from the Latin *respicere*, looking back with care) the other as other, without reducing it to any S/self (in its metaphysical connotation and psychological implication of ‘I am’ conceit). The Middle Way as *praxis*, not all-encompassing, panoramic *theorein*, not vāda (school) with its inevitable pull to reduce possibilities to a single ‘view.’ Although language is ultimately inadequate to exemplify practice, we are nonetheless inevitably compelled to utilise it to mediate between path and goal, heedfully avoiding from

\textsuperscript{61} Watts, 1962: 200.

falling into a delusory and partial understanding of them as extreme, binary pairs. The silence of paramārtha as paññā/prajñā and the language of saṃvṛti as mahā-karuṇā.

Fragrant fynbos
Battered by wind and waves:
Is it gone?

Bibliography


---

63 Ruegg, 1989: 244.

64 ‘Paraphrasing Nagao: ‘As the “silence” of paramārtha is true “Wisdom” (prajñā), logic, which was recovered and molded into the form of language, represents “Great Compassion” (mahā-karuṇā) of the Buddha towards the illusory world. The Madhyamic logic… is a logic of Love – a skilful device of the Great Compassion – supported by the Wisdom of śūnyatā’, in Nagao, 1991: 46.'
Earhart, H.B., 1974, Religion in the Japanese Experience: Sources and Interpretations, California, Dickenson Publishing Company, INC.


Harvey, P., 2008a, Session 1: Introduction and the Early Buddhist Theory of Truth, BUDM04, University of Sunderland.

Harvey, P., 2008b, Session 5: Abhidhamma literature and principles, BUDM04, University of Sunderland.
Harvey, P., 2008c, Session 7: Conditioned Arising: its nature, and how it is known, BUDM04, University of Sunderland.

Harvey, P., 2008d, Session 13: Wrong view, right view and right seeing/no view, BUDM04, University of Sunderland.

Harvey, P., 2008e, Session 14: The undetermined questions on the world materials, BUDM04, University of Sunderland.

Harvey, P., 2008f, Session 17: The nature of Nirvāṇa, BUDM04, University of Sunderland.

Harvey, P., 2008g, Session 18: The enlightened one as untraceable in life and beyond death, BUDM04, University of Sunderland.

Harvey, P., 2008h, Session 20: The Madhyamaka on emptiness and the transcending of views, section 10, BUDM04, University of Sunderland.

Harvey, P., 2008i, Session 29: Zen, nature and the arts, Section 1, BUDM04, University of Sunderland.


Meiland, J., 2007, Pali Language Course, part of BUDM06, Pali Language Module, p. 120 of PDF. file revised on 11 April 2007.


